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Abstract—This letter introduces the concept of antifragile
electronic warfare (EW), which we define as the ability to allow a
communications link to improve performance due to the presence
of a jammer. This concept should not be confused with jamming
countermeasures (a.k.a. anti-jamming or electronic protection).
Rather, antifragile EW can be thought of as the next step beyond
simply avoiding or mitigating jamming.
Index Terms—antifragile, electronic warfare, anti-jamming,
jamming, communications, exploiting, cognitive radio.
Antifragility is a concept popularized by professor Nassim
Nicholas Taleb, and a term he coined in his 2012 book,
Antifragile [1]. Antifragility refers to systems that increase
in capability, resilience, or robustness as a result of mistakes,
faults, attacks, or failures [1]. As Taleb explains in his book,
antifragility is fundamentally different from the concepts of re-
siliency (i.e. the ability to recover from failure) and robustness
(i.e. ability to resist failure).
Electronic warfare (EW) refers to any action involving the
use of electromagnetic energy to control the electromagnetic
spectrum. EW is typically broken down into three subdi-
visions: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP),
and electronic support (ES). EA and EP refer to jamming
and anti-jamming respectively, while ES refers to searching,
identifying, and locating jammers. While EW encompasses
wireless communications, radar, and directed energy weapons,
we limit our analysis to wireless communications.
We propose adding a fourth subdivision to EW, called
Antifragile Electronic Warfare (AEW), in which the commu-
nication system being jammed increases in performance as a
result of the jamming attack. AEW can be considered as an
extension to EP or, rather, going a level beyond EP. In a typical
EP scheme, the radio performs waveform adaption (e.g. using
cognitive radio techniques) in order to remain operable under
jamming, with or without sacrificing performance. However, in
AEW, the radio is able to exploit a jamming attack to achieve
higher effectiveness/performance as a result of jamming (an
example is given in Table I).
We will now investigate how to achieve a communications
gain due to the presence of a jammer, and the conditions
under which it is feasible. Basic jammers, such as barrage or
random jammers, operate as programmed and do not change
their behavior. If the communications system has no influence
on the jammer, then it is impossible to cause the jammer to
transmit desired information, or perform any other action that
could lead to a communications gain. There is a subcategory
of jammers that react to sensed energy or signals, known
as reactive jammers [2]. These jammers must have receiving
capability, and the most common form of reactive jamming
is repeater jamming (a.k.a. digital RF memory or DRFM
jamming) in which the jammer repeats the signal it receives.
In terms of information theory, if the transmitted signal X is
jammed by signal J , a communications gain is only possible
if the mutual information between the two is greater than zero,
denoted as I(X; J) > 0.
One way to improve capability of communications is to
increase the amount of bits transferred between radios for
a given amount of energy. If a radio can transmit in a
manner that causes a reactive jammer to relay its information
without degrading the data or the original signal, the radio
can harness the jammer’s higher transmit power. In essence,
one could create a customized waveform and information
alphabet by exploiting the characteristics of the jammer’s
response. By providing this second (redundant) data stream
to the receiver, the error rate can be reduced (increasing the
amount of bits transferred to the receiver), and thus provide
an AEW advantage. For example, if the jammer transmits
noise on all channels that it believes contain energy, then the
communications system could begin using wideband multi-
frequency FSK across selected multiple channels (to create an
communications alphabet), in such a way that the intended
communication signal and the jamming signal are receiving
orthogonally and soft-combined after being separately demod-
ulated. The specific hopping rate would be a function of the
reactive jammer’s delay and channels covered, and would have
to take into account any timing jitter. Hence, the reactive
jammer’s transmitted waveform can be treated as a redundant
version of the signal, which can potentially improve the bit
error rate without requiring the communications system to
transmit additional energy. The jammer’s effect is similar to
introducing multipath propagation, with relatively long delay
spreads and there are numerous signal processing techniques
that can be used to exploit multipath (delayed transmission).
For example, the AEW receiver could implement some sort of
maximum ratio combining after proper channel estimation and
equalization for each signal path (receive diversity). This is just
a simple example; more approaches to AEW are envisioned
and will be analyzed in future research.
Simply knowing that a reactive jammer is present is not
enough to perform AEW. A functioning AEW strategy is
based on the scenario at hand; i.e. the type of communi-
cations link, the reactive jammer’s characteristics, and the
delays/jitters involved. Therefore, an effective strategy involves
implementation of a series of different schemes that exploit
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the jammer and a classifier that can identify the scenario at
hand and estimate parameters associated with it. Lastly, it
must incorporate an engine that can assign the most effective
AEW scheme to the given scenario. Figure 1 illustrates the
components of the proposed AEW system (highlighted in
yellow) and how they fit into a communications system.
As the sophistication of communications systems and jam-
mers increases, reactive jamming will likely become a big-
ger threat in military and other mission-critical domains.
Therefore, it may be worthwhile to consider incorporating an
antifragile component into state of the art protected radios. As
part of future research we will continue to develop the concept
of AEW.
TABLE I
A SIMPLE EXAMPLE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MITIGATION AND
ANTIFRAGILITY
Scenario Example Throughput
Non-jammed (baseline) 1 Mbps
Jammed without built-in countermeasures 0.2 Mbps
Jammed with built-in countermeasures 0.9 Mbps
Jammed with built-in Antifragility (AEW) 1.1 Mbps
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Fig. 1. The components of the proposed AEW system (highlighted in yellow) and how they fit into a communications system
